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Abstract 
 
Islam, the Muslim traditions and the ulama in Central Asian societies are becoming increasingly important 
for assessing the situation in and around the region. To understand of the post Soviet Muslim republics it is nec-
essary to know the Islamic heritage of the Soviet Union, i.e. the Islamic understanding and interpretation of So-
viet official ulama which still influence the mind of the people and the contemporary Central Asian ulama. The 
official ulama were endeavouring to reconcile Islam with science and progress and to guarantee its survival in a 
modern environment, they served by an extremely energetic effort to preserve Islam at least in purity and integ-
rity as religion and national sentiment and to prevent it from relapsing into deprivation and ignorance. The most 
important official Muslim religious figure, the Mufti of Tashkent Z. Babakhan interpreted Islam as a bulwark of 
progress, disseminator of knowledge, the religion of peace and friendship; portrayed the Prophet Muhammad as 
a “democrat, reformer and revolutionary, even a socialist”; reconciliation with socialism and communism. 
Key words: Soviet Islam, Soviet Ulama, Central Asia.  
 
To understand of the post Soviet Muslim republics it is necessary to know the Islamic heri-
tage of the Soviet Union, i.e. the Islamic understanding and interpretation of Soviet official 
ulama / clergy which still dominate and influence the mind of the people and the contempo-
rary Central Asian ulama.  
Islam, the Muslim traditions and the ulama in Central Asian societies are becoming in-
creasingly important for assessing the situation in and around the region. In Central Asia Is-
lam has always been one of the dominant factors of the religious and cultural identity, regulat-
ing internal life and to some extent external orientations of the region, even under the Soviet 
Government. This is true of the towns, where the quarter (the mahallah) remained the smallest 
unofficial social unit in which traditional relationships between people were made sacred by 
Islam, where people always performed the main religious observances, and where the ulama 
enjoyed prestige and were influential by virtue of their knowledge. It is also true of the coun-  2
tryside, which has preserved the rules of communal relations that became adapted to the col-
lective-farm system.  
More correctly formulated, Islam is one impact on social and political life an instrument by 
the ruling elite as well as by the opposition; and even in foreign policy particularly to 
strengthen the authority of Central Asian states in the Muslim world. This circumstance 
should be neither ignored nor considered an absolute, especially in making political decisions. 
The turning to Islam in the region has a complex and controversial character. On the one 
hand, all the Central Asian states are secular in accordance with their constitutions, religion is 
separated from politics. On the other hand, practically any country of the region has avoided 
registering a special attitude to Islam on the part of the official authorities, including the top-
level figures of the states.  
 
The Official Interpreters of Islam in the Soviet Union: the Ulama  
 
There is no clergy in Islam in Western sense since based on the belief that no intermediary 
between the believer and Allah. But in the course history to comment on Islamic matters and 
to lead the believers in collective prayers religious leadership emerged. As in every Muslim 
society in the Soviet Union the ulama was considered into two categories: the official ulama 
and the unofficial ulama. In this article we dealt with the first one. The ulama of the region 
has been playing very considerable role in the social, political, economic and cultural life for a 
long time.  
At the very beginning of the Bolshevik Revolution the Tatar Muslim nationalist communist 
Sultan Galiev (1880-1939?), seeing an obstacle to antireligious propaganda pointed out the 
power and role of the ulama among the Russian Muslims stating that: “… the situation of the 
Muslim clergy among Russia is that whereas among Russians we find on parish for every 
10.000 to 12.000 inhabitants, among Muslims there is one mosque for every 700 to 1.000 
souls and each mosque is served by at least three members of the clergy: the mullah, his assis-
tant, and the muezzin. The strength of the Muslim clergy can also be explained by reason of its 
social and political position among the Muslim population. The mullah is at the same time 
priest (in charge of religious rites), teacher (each mullah has a religious school connected to 
his mosque: mektep or medreseh), administrator (in charge of regulating estates, registering 
civil acts of stage), judge (competent in affairs of marriage, divorce, and succession), and at 
times even a doctor of medicine. Furthermore, the Muslim clergy are elected and this places 
them in more favourable and solid position than, for example, the Russian clergy. The Rus-
sian priest, appointed by the superior authority, certainly has a lesser authority over his flock 
than does the Tatar or the Uzbek ulama in his mahalla. The latter consider themselves just the 
same to be “servants of the people” and lend an attentive ear to their wishes. They are more 
democratic and closer to the people, and exercise a greater influence on them than does the 
village priest over Russian muzhik.”
1  
From the right beginning of the Umayyad period to now there have been two kinds of the 
ulama: the official ulama (ulema-i resmi) and the non-official ulama (ulema-i gayr-i resmi). 
The first one has always been on the side of authority because of that they depend on the offi-
cial salary of income to some extent economically. This is why, it has been said that they try 
to legitimize the policy of the authority to persuade the mass. For doing that they found evi-
dence from the Koran in which “Tumult and oppression are worse than slaughter” (Koran, 
II/217). Therefore they always want the peace or stability in the state as well as in the society. 
The ulama have responded in diverse ways to the ideological and political developments 
partly because in each region they related to localized political and historical situation. The 
orientation of the ulama derived in part from their position vis-à-vis the political structure. On 
the other hand, that position depended to a degree on the government’s relative strength.    3
Under the Soviet regime thorough co-operating apparently willingly, with the authorities 
the ulama were expected: 1. to demonstrate to the outside world the Soviet Union as a show-
case of communist economic achievements that more successful and rewarding than Western 
capitalism; 2. to testify to the freedom, welfare and general prosperity of Islam in the USSR; 
3. to demonstrate that the USSR is the best friend and partner of the Muslim world. At first 
sight it seems a paradox that the Soviet official ulama served the atheist state, but they had 
had to adopt themselves to the new situation. 
The Central Asian and Transcaucasian pre-revolutionary hereditary ulama survived until 
the Second World War. Especially after 1941 when the German armies started to invade Rus-
sia, the Soviet Government followed a relatively soft policy towards all religion. In this re-
spect, assessing that Islam is no longer a direct threat to the Soviet Government, on the con-
trary helping factor for the interest of the country and its people decided to show some ‘leni-
ency’ with regard to religious figures. Moreover, for dividing Islam geographically, creating 
centralized ‘religious administrations’, controlling the ulama, reinforcing the liberal moderate 
and loyal establishment and checking the expansion of the radical-conservative and anti-
Soviet Islamic movements Stalin set up four Muslim religious boards (Dini İdare / Müftiyat / 
Dukhovniye Upravlenia) in 1942 for Central Asian, Transcausians, Northern Caucasian and 
Russian Muslims.
2  
The Muslim Religious Boards guided theoretically by the Koran, the Hadith and the 
maslahat / the interests of the believers to resolve questions of religious dogma. The decision / 
fatwa of a religious board on any religious question were brought to the knowledge of all 
Muslims over signature of the mufti of the Religious Board.
3
After the Second World War the most important Islamic establishment in the USSR was 
the Muslim Religious Board for Central Asia and Kazakhstan where 75 per cent of the Soviet 
Muslim lived. The Soviet Government depended on the Mufti of Tashkent for propagation of 
its views among the Sunni Muslims of the Islamic World (rarely on the shaikhu’l-Islam of 
Baku among the Shiite Muslims). It was the only one to have a publication facility, and the 
only two official medreses in the USSR. The Board’s inconsistent and conformist position has 
been criticized by unofficial even official spiritual leaders.
4 The official ulama never pro-
tested against anti-religious pressure and fulfilled the task which it is entrusted. 
The Soviet ulama’s composition of was heterogeneous. With a few old survivors of Sta-
lin’s repression, trained in the pre-1928 Turkistani or Tatar medreses, the young ulama gradu-
ated of the two Central Asian medreses Mir Arab of Bukhara and Imam Bukhari of Tashkent, 
who in some cases had completed their education abroad, in Egypt, Morocco, Syria, Yemen 
or Libya.
5 The last group may be subdivided into two categories: sons of ulama for whom 
clerical careers were hereditary especially in Central Asia and Caucasus and former Soviet 
intellectuals who, before joining the Muslim establishment, finished their studies in regular 
Soviet schools an even in universities.
6
 
The Atheistic Assaults on Islam and Muslims in the USSR 
 
The lands of the Soviet Muslims i.e., Central Asians and Caucasians was a “frontier world” 
located along the extreme northern and north-eastern border of the World of Islam (Daru’l-
Islam), facing the World of War (Daru’l-Harb). This inhospitable geography contrived to 
give the Soviet Muslims a unique character. The Soviet Muslims, in their history have been 
faced the challenger of the “infidels”, the Khazars, the Qara-Khıtays, the Mongols, the Kal-
muks, and Christian and Marxist Russians, by the methods they employed: attempted geno-
cide thorough wholesale massacres, massive or selective transfer of population, religious 
proselytism, biological or cultural assimilation and so on. The response and reaction of the 
Muslims to these challengers took many different forms such as 1. efforts to preserve the ter-  4
ritory and the culture by armed resistance and uprising, especially by Sufi brotherhoods under 
the leadership of feudal lords; 2. defence of Islam thorough conservative or modernist move-
ments against encroachment by rival ideologies, whether Buddhist, Christian or Marxist; 3. 
co-operation with infidels in the hope of eventually regaining lost power.
7 The Soviet official 
ulama were in the third category, moderate and mainly followed the footsteps of the pre-
revolutionary Tatar jadidism
8.  
The ulama faced an unprecedented atheistic challenge and assault in the Soviet period. At 
the beginning the Marxist Soviet regime which claimed representative of scientific truth and 
future believed that the destruction of the old order would be an easy process, since Islam, 
like all other religions, was but a superstition from the past. It launched the massive assault 
against Islam around 1928. Its avowed goal was the destruction of Islam in order to bring 
about equality between Russians and Muslims, when would only be contemplated once all 
Soviet citizens were free form psychological ties of the past, in particular from the false ide-
ologies propagated by the exploiting classes. The Bolsheviks believed that the staunch adher-
ence of Muslims to the juridical and moral code of Islam erected psychological barriers be-
tween them and the non-Muslims. 
The themes of anti-Islamic propaganda have fixed from the very beginning. Marxist argu-
ments directed against all religion. The atheists denounced categorically religion is the 
“opium of toiling masses, distracting them from the social struggle against the exploiting 
parasites”; “it has played -and still playing- a reactionary role, being an instrument for spiri-
tual oppression of workers”; “it inculcates in man the spirit of resignation and humility, thus 
distracting him from revolutionary activity”; “it is a fanciful, fallacious and anti-scientific 
creed, projecting the dream of Paradise into an imaginary other world”; and finally, the main 
argument used against all religions, “as a spiritual creed, is a hangover from the pre-socialist 
past, it is a mere survival doomed to disappear. It has no place in Marxist socialist world, 
which is building paradise on this earth… Marxism-Leninism and religious ideology are 
therefore incompatible and irreconcilable… and the Communist Party cannot remain indiffer-
ent or natural towards religion… it must fight it and defeat it.” The atheists used special ar-
guments against Islam. According to atheistic propaganda, far form being the national or na-
tive religion of the Soviet Muslims, Islam is a foreign religion, brought to Central Asia and 
Caucasus by alien invaders i.e., Arabs, Persians and Ottoman Turks. Islam is claimed as the 
most conservative, even reactionary, and the least “social”: it sanctifies in its followers fanati-
cism, intolerance and xenophobia; it sets “Believers” against “Infidels” and is therefore an 
obstacle to friendship between different peoples of the Soviet Union. Islamic rites and cus-
toms, such as circumcision and fasting were criticised as primitive, barbarian and unhealthy, 
Islamic morals are thought to be opposed to Communist morals, with Islamic art and literature 
ossified and unable to evolve or progress. In summary, Islam belongs to the past, not even to 
the capitalist stage of evolution, but to the feudal era. As such, it has no place in society of 
“advanced socialism”.
9  
 
The Official Islamic Interpretation of the Soviet Ulama  
 
With the main concern of preserving Islam under “infidel (kafir / dinsiz / bi-din) rule”, the 
Soviet ulama exhibited a high liberal even progressive intellectuality. They engaged in cau-
tious but demonstrably effective propaganda in support of Islam, since felt responsibility for a 
religious intellectual revival among the Soviet Muslims. One of the most important themes 
advanced by the official ulama was that Islam is the most liberal, humanist and advanced of 
all religions, that it was endowed with the highest and most progressive culture, is the best 
fitted to prepare the faithful for construction of real socialism and that Muslims are the best -
even the only people capable of building socialism. Moreover Islam is one of the greatest doc-  5
trines in the history of humanity. Its basis is the Koran which its principles and letters remain 
invariable and valid in the course of the centuries, guide for all generations of believers. This 
is because Islam is always contemporaneous. By its teachings it can be found the correct solu-
tion to all vital problems of life and answers to the most complex and confused questions. 
Lastly, there is no contradiction whatsoever between Marxism and Islam, because socialism 
in its ideal form is but a fulfilment of Islamic promises.  
To search official interpretation of Islam in the USSR we have four fundamental sources. 
They are 1. the collection of the official fatwas mainly comes from the Tashkent Muftiyat; 2. 
the official periodical of the Tashkent Muftiyat Muslims of Soviet East;
10 3. the book of the 
Grand Mufti of Tashkent Ziyauddin Babakhan
11 Islam and Muslims in the Land of Soviets;
12 
4. and some works of the Soviet atheists.
13 For analysing the official interpretation of the So-
viet ulama we mainly sought after the views and comments of the Mufti since summarises the 
official approaches. 
The Mufti aimed three audiences: to persuade outside world that there was freedom, pro-
gress and prosperity for Muslims in the USSR, to response atheistic claims and to teach Islam 
to the Soviet Muslims.  
First of all, Babakhan looks Islam and its history, especially the Central Asian one as a 
source of pride, success and confidence for all Muslims even all humanity. He thinks and be-
lieves that hence Islam not only a religion and wisdom, at the same time it is a way of life, 
suitable for people of all ages, nations and races, and the most widely differing social 
groups.
14  
On the contrary to the atheistic claims, Babakhan underlines that in the past ulama has 
achieved understanding of Islam and developed Islamic sciences such as Islamic jurispru-
dence (fıqh), theology (kalam), commentary (tafsir), sayings of the Prophet (hadith), history 
(tarihk) etc. To revitalise Islam he says that “the present dynamic epoch demands us that we 
should synthesise all the best that our predecessors achieved and, relaying on ideas of the 
Holy Koran and the Sunna, we should lead the faithful along the path of Truth thorough intri-
cate labyrinth of events in the age of the splitting of the atom and the conquest of Space... As 
the eminent theologian Mohammad Abduh said in his day, the meaning of the Holy Koran is 
to be commented in accordance with the requirements of the times.”
15
He never mentions the Sufi tradition of the Central Asia and Caucasus since in the atheis-
tic literature Sufism severely criticized and the Soviet authorities forced the ulama to con-
demn such activities. In this connection the Religious boards opened a front to battle the Sufi 
circles. At the end of the 1950s Babakhan issued fatwas on Sufism.
16
The Mufti referred in his book 30 sources from the East and West. He applied al-Bukhari’s 
al-Sahih, al-Mufrad, al-Thulathiyat, al-Ghazali’s al-Ihya, al-Maghinani’s al-Hidaya, al-
Kawakibi’s at-Tabaiu’l-İstibdat, Amin al-Xoli’s al-Alaqa beyne’l-Nil wa’l-Wolga, Yakut al-
Hamawi’s al-Mujam, the Russian orientalists E. A. Belyayev’s Prosixojenie Islama, I. Y. 
Krachkovski’s  İzbirannie Trudi, Y. Kuznetsov’s Duruziya na piyati continentax, V. A. 
Kreyedov’s Religia i zakon, documents of Muslim congress in the USSR and the Muslim 
World, weekly published in Karachi. Among them there are no Turk and Turkish one.  
 
The Main Themes of the Official Interpretation  
 
1. The Relationship between the Soviet State and Islam 
 
It seems that the Mufti welcomes the policy of the Soviets, of Lenin on religion and Mus-
lims since the Tsarist regime as an official policy humiliated Islam, Muslims and the ulama 
before Christianity. It is clear that every restriction under the tsar on all religions except the 
state / Orthodox religion was an infringement of the interests and insult to the dignity of many   6
nationalities. According the Mufti, in that time Islam was the religion of oppressed peoples, 
the Muslims of Russian Empire suffered not only social but also national oppression. Their 
religion and customs were trampled on and they themselves were victims of discrimination in 
various fields of life, their lands were turned into colonies. However, within a few years after 
the Bolshevik Revolution, some of the ulama, especially the official ones, had begun to urge 
acceptance the new regime. For example, the Muslim Religious Board of Ufa pronounced a 
fatwa declaring that “By the great grace of Allah, the Revolution which has taken in Russia 
has destroyed a brutal, despotic autocracy which persecuted the Religion of Islam”.
17 Also the 
Mufti of Mahkeme-i Şer’iye (the Highest Muslim Religious Board of Turkistan in Tashkent) 
Zahiruddin Allam, declared a supporting fatwa in 1925.
18   
Form the point of view of Babakhan, the Soviets started to get away such policies and to 
make people equal before the law, because they were in need of the Muslim support to get the 
power and to achieve the revolution. The Soviets saw Muslims their allies in fighting imperi-
alism and colonialism for the country’s socialist development. Hence it is not surprising that 
as early as November 20, 1917, less than a month after the October Socialist Revolution, 
Lenin, published a special appeal “To All the Working Muslims of Russia and the East”. Un-
conditionally taking the side of Muslims working people, “whose mosques and prayer-house 
were destroyed, their beliefs, and customs trampled underfoot” by the previous regime, the 
Soviet government solemnly declared “Henceforth your beliefs and customs, your national 
and cultural institutions were declared free and inviolable. Arrange your national life freely 
and without hindrance. You have a right to do that.”
19  
The Soviet Government issued its first decree on religious affairs called “On the Separa-
tion of the Church from the State and the School from the Church” dated January 23, 1918, 
quarantined all citizens of Soviet Russia complete freedom of conscience and declared all 
religious belief, including Islam is as “a matter of the individual conscience.”
20 Babakhan 
cheers up this secularist historic decree. With regards to the separation between religion and 
state the Mufti considers that the decree advanced the democratic concept of equality of all 
religion before the law. All religious associations were obliged to submit to the general prin-
ciples on private associations and unions. The Orthodox Church ceased to enjoy any state 
privileges and to receive any financial aid from the state. The equality of religions proclaimed 
by the decree was deeply humane and answered above all the aspirations of the peoples of the 
Soviet East, the Muslims. By proclaiming equality of religions the decree forbade the promul-
gation of any local laws and decisions which would restrain or restrict equal exercise of free-
dom of conscience by all citizens.
21  
According to the Mufti, the Soviet state kept on to support the Muslims with many other 
acts. In January 1918, the Commissariat for Muslim Affairs was instituted in order to guaran-
tee the equality of Islam. In addition to this, the Bolsheviks presented one of the holiest treas-
ures of the Muslims, the Caliph Othman Koran.
22 On the “defender of the rights of oppressed 
peoples”, Lenin’s instructions, simultaneously with the Othman Koran, the Muslim ancient 
architectural monument of the Kazan, the minaret of Suyumbike and well-known Karavan-
Sarai mosque in the Ufa were also placed at the disposal of the Muslims.
23  
The Mufti reminds that the basic principles of Soviet legislation on religious cults are re-
flected in Article 52 of the new constitution of the USSR.
24 In the Soviet Union, manifesta-
tions of religious intolerance or incitement to hostility towards believers of any religious af-
filiation or towards unbelievers are regarded as crimes. The Soviet state vigilantly guards the 
rights of believers. It is established strict disciplinary and legal responsibility of persons vio-
lating their legitimate rights. The law obliges officials of state bodies to consider in good time 
any complaint or statement by believers and categorically forbids any restriction of citizens’ 
rights because of their attitude to religion. It is regarded as criminal offence for any official to   7
refuse to accept a person for work or in any educational establishment or to dismiss a person 
from work or from an educational establishment because of his or her religious views.
25
Therefore, the Soviet official ulama supported the new constitution of the Soviet State. 
Over the 60
th anniversary of the Soviet regime in 1977, The Soviet Government adopted a 
new constitution. In the discussion and propaganda process the Muslim discussed the draft 
constitution in mosques to make specific suggestions to improve it. Both high-ranking ulama 
and believers hailed the draft constitution and made their contribution to its countrywide dis-
cussion.
26 For example, Hajı Atajan Abdullaev, the imam-khatib of the Talhatan Baba 
Mosque of Turkmenistan said about the draft: “Having read the draft constitution carefully, 
we Muslims saw that its purpose and meaning is to meet the growing materials and cultural 
needs of the people, to give every Soviet citizen a greater part in running the country, to safe 
guard the freedom and equality of all the people of our country an to strengthen friendship 
and brotherly cooperation among them. Very many articles of the draft constitution are the 
consonant with the doctrine of the Holy Koran and pronouncements of our Prophet Muham-
mad. We endorse the draft constitution totally and without reservation because it expresses 
the will and cherished aspirations of all the peoples of our country including the Turkmenian 
people.” The Mufti of Makhachkala also sent a message approving the new constitution.
27    
The Mufti thinks that the main yardstick of a person’s position in society is his or her work 
for the good of the people. By guarantying the fundamental human rights, since in the early 
years of Soviet power the Muslim regions were considerably advance in their socio-economic 
life and general development behind a number of other regions of the country, special favour-
able conditions were provided for their representatives for many years as regards admission to 
educational establishment and appointment to leading post. Hence it is not surprising that the 
peoples of the Soviet East ascended the ladder of education, then for instance, Russians, and 
in short time, with the help of other nationalities in the country, attained the summits of hu-
man civilisation.
28  
When speaking of the genuine equality of Muslims with other citizens of the country Ba-
bakhan cites some examples which confirm every day and every hour that the Muslims make 
extensive use of their rights. From his point of view neither they nor their children are sub-
jected to discrimination. The country’s schools and higher educational establishments are al-
ways open to them and they always have unlimited opportunity for putting their abilities into 
practice, for filling any appointments in state apparatus, industry, agriculture or in various 
institutions and organisations at widely differing levels. It is shown that prominent statement, 
public figures and major specialists in various branches of economy and culture have come 
from among Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Turkmens, and other peoples of the Soviet East. They show 
skill in economic and political management of their sovereign republics and take an active 
part in solving all-Union or even world problems in the highest organs of the state power and 
apparatus.
29
 
2. Islam and Socialism: as close friends 
 
The Mufti starts the topic with the question “Why did the Muslims in the Soviet Union ac-
cept the principles of socialism so quickly? Why have many Muslim countries of Asia and 
Africa, on achieving political independence, chosen the path of socialist orientation?”  
According to the Mufti, the answer these questions correctly it must be compared the basic 
social and moral principles of Islam and of scientific socialism. Such a comparison will con-
vince us that these principles have much in common, much that is mutually acceptable.
30
For supporting his ideas the Mufti tries to find out some similarities between Islam and so-
cialism. To him, Islam teaches that since people depend on one another there are close social 
links in society. The work of each man is a contribution to the good of society. Hence it is the   8
duty of every citizen to work, aiming at the highest possible quality. The Prophet Muhammad 
says in this connection: “The best of men is he who is of the greatest use to people.” It is soci-
ety’s duty to provide every member with the possibility to get work, and also to give him fair 
payment. The only exceptions are those who are unable to work, but must receive the means 
of subsistence from society such as the zakat. Like Islamic environment, every citizen of the 
Soviet Union, irrespective of colour of skin, nationality, religious affiliation or origin, feels 
that he is an integral part of society as a whole, a person equal in rights and free, whose labour 
merges with the efforts of the entire people to create well-being for all and the conditions for a 
happy life of all society. Moreover, all labour is honoured and respected. Every person is 
guaranteed a real right to work and all those who are unable to work receive a pension from 
the state.
31  
With the consideration that the practise of socialist society as regards the universal duty to 
work those not actually differ from the humane principles of Islam the Mufti says that “it is 
therefore scarcely any wonder that the Muslims of the Soviet Union, observing the teaching 
the Prophet Muhammad, endeavour to contribute as much as possible to the prosperity of their 
Motherland, and by their highly productive labour promote the rising of the entire people’s 
well-being.”
32  
Babakhan assumes that one of the most important principles of socialism is the striving to 
support the social activity of the individual. Socialism commands that it is impossible to build 
a prosperous society and ensure a happy life for all people unless everyman is active in work 
and in the socio-political field. This theory and practice is very close to Islam. It prescribes 
every believer to live a full and happy life, to make the interest of society his own. The Holy 
Koran also says: “O you believe! Give of the good things which ye have (honourably) earned 
and of the fruits of the earth which We have produced for you, and do not even aim at getting 
anything which is bad, in order that out of it ye may give away something, when you yourself 
would not receive it.” (Koran II/ 267) “He who devotedly serves humanity and his country 
will be more honoured and respected of God” is one of the most important ideas of Islam. In 
the socialist teaching, as in Islam, the society has priority over the individual. Islam teaches 
that happiness of every individual is achieved through happiness of society as a whole by 
serving society. Allah himself predetermined solidarity of people, their cooperation in good 
deeds. The individual, counter poses himself to society; tries to get advantages for him can not 
hope to achieve happiness either on earth or in life hereafter. The Holy Koran resolutely cen-
sures inveterate individualists who care only for their own welfare.
33
Babakhan comes one of the decisive issues of the Soviet regime, ownership (al-temellük). 
To him a thorough analysis of the principal sources of Islam, in the first place of the Koran 
and the Sunna, shows that in Islam there are two forms of ownership:  private (al-temelluku’l-
hâs / al-shahsiyya) and social (al-temelluku’l-âm).
34 The private ownership recognized by 
Islam is an individual’s personal work. Islam forbids becoming rich on another person’s work. 
For example, the sharia strictly prescribes the rule that the land belongs to those who till it. 
The Prophet for preserving the interests of the working people and supporting the rational use 
of natural resources says that “He who tills an empty field thereby acquires ownership of it.” 
Following the same rule Islam strictly forbids usury, monopolising of goods and giving short 
weight or measure since not to allow some people to get rich at the expense of others, to edu-
cate all members of society in the spirit of honesty and justice, to respect for work and work-
ing man. Allah says in the Holy Koran “Woe to those that deal in fraud, those who, when they 
have receive by measures form men, exact full measure, but when they have to give by meas-
ure or weight to men, give less than due.” (Koran LXXXIII/1-3)
35  
The social ownership envisaged by Islam is social property. The purpose and role the so-
cial ownership in society are to serve all the people as a single collective, its wellbeing and 
prosperity. Social ownership should include all means in the world. The Prophet Muhammad   9
proclaimed the following principle: “There things are common to all: water, grass and fire.” 
At that time, when animal husbandry was the leading branch of economy, which fed, clothed 
and shod the members of society, when water was valued higher than diamonds, for without it 
life was impossible for man or beast, these three things were, indeed, the main items ensuring 
society’s very existence.
36 Allah records this conception in the Holy Koran: “O you people! 
Adhore your Guardina-Lord, Who created you, and those who came before you, that ye may 
have to chance to learn righteousness; Who has made the earth your couch, and the heavens 
for canopy; and sent down rain form the heavens; and brought forth therewith fruits for your 
sustenance...” (Koran II/21-22). Such authoritative interpreters commenting on this ayah, 
stress that Allah here reminds people of the tree basic divine blessing created for man’s bene-
fit and necessary to ensure his normal subsistence. These basic blessings are land, air and wa-
ter, which may not belong to any single person but must be the property of humanity as a 
whole.
37  
The Mufti supposes that in the Muslim countries as time went on, by developing the pro-
ductive forces of society, a number objects such as big factories, huge electric power-stations, 
the land and the irrigation system, became the basis of economy and came to be included 
among the chief means. Therefore, some of the biggest ulama came to the opinion that, soci-
ety had the natural an inalienable right of ownership of these objects too. The correctness of 
this view is confirmed not only by the enormous role of these objects in the life of society, but 
also by the fact that, as a rule, they are produced by efforts of the whole society. And society 
can nationalise such objects, guided by the general Islamic principle that society has full an 
unlimited right to nationalise any object if such a measure protects the interests of society, 
prevents damage to them, or leads to the successful solution of the problems facing society. 
Many socio-economic transformations carried out in a number of Muslim states have been 
effected within the framework of Islamic socialism and are in no way contrary to the prescrip-
tions of the Koran and the Sunna.
38
Babakhan, after these assumptions comes to the conclusion that the prominent Muslim fig-
ures in Central Asia as their colleagues abroad approved the confiscation of the land of the big 
landowners by the Soviet Government in the interest of the working people and peasants. For 
example, a fatwa issued by the Mahkama-i Shar’iyya of Turkistan in 1927 stating: “It is ille-
gitimate and reprehensible for a person to get harvest from the land and make use of it, while 
being not engaged in agriculture but renting the land out to others for sowing... The govern-
ment has the right to take away the surplus land from the big landowners and to give it to the 
peasants who need land and are in a position to cultivate it by their own efforts.”
39
The Mufti puts the Islamic ideas and efforts behind the Soviet achievements stating that 
“history confirmed the reasonableness, humanity and justice of this statement. If today the 
Soviet Union is a world power, the bulwark of the world peace and social progress, if the 
peoples of our country are guaranteed unprecedented economic and cultural development and 
high growth rates of material well-being, if our country can render great assistance to devel-
oping countries in creating a modern economy, this has become possible to a decisive degree 
owing to the confiscation of the land, works and factories from the big proprietors and their 
transformation into the property of society, that is, of the whole people.”
40  
To justify the Soviet regime Babakhan refers Egyptian Muslim thinker Kawakibi. Accord-
ing to the Mufti, Kawakibi, by explaining the nature of the power and government, in his 
book The Nature of Despotism (at-Tabaiu’l-İstibdat) described the ideal society basing the 
fundamental principles of the Koran and the Sunna. Kawakibi includes the following among 
the most important functions of the state: satisfaction of people’s spiritual and physical re-
quirements; respect for the opinions of every member of society; guarantee of equality, jus-
tice, safety of property and honour safeguarded by law. Babakhan believes that Kawakibi’s 
ideal society is not only implemented in the USSR, but much more thoroughly put into prac-  10
tice. In the Soviet Union it has been accomplished the comprehensive development of the 
economy and culture, the provision of the universal primary education, the guarantee of 
equality and justice for all citizens, the formation of the leading bodies of the USSR, which 
represent all the nations and classes in miniature, equal distribution of material and cultural 
values between the classes, nations and various religious groups. In other words, many of the 
lofty and highly humane principles of Islam have been realised in Soviet socialist society.
41
The Mufti mentions so-called supports of the Soviet regime, especially of Lenin in cultural 
and economic fields. He never touches the Muslim uprisings against the Soviet hegemony 
during the civil war. On the contrary he thinks that Lenin liberated the oppressed Muslim 
peoples of the East form the hands of the imperialist powers. He called this relationship 
“friendship and cooperation” To him “A prominent role in creating the inviolable friendship 
of the peoples of the Soviet Union was played by this great friend of the peoples of the East – 
Vladimir Ilych Lenin”
42  
 
3. The Islamic Moral: as a base for peace, coexistence and cooperation 
    in the Soviet Union 
 
Babakhan interprets Islamic moral as a base for coexistence and cooperation, of course to 
make easy to life in the Soviet Union with different nationalities. He says that Muslims are all 
proud that as early as 1400 years ago Islam resolutely and clearly condemned all race dis-
crimination. Islam thus manifests one of its most remarkable features as a universal, world 
religion equally close and just all people.
43 To him, Islamic moral is exceptionally humane 
and eternally contemporaneous. The combination of moral and legal standards in it does not 
distort its humane and progressive nature. Islam teaches believers love and mercy for all peo-
ple whatever their race, nationality, religious belief, and social origin. The cornerstone of Is-
lamic moral teaching is the idea that man is born to be happy. The Creator Allah loves him, 
does not discriminate between people according to their living standards, the colour of skin, 
or nationality.
44  
He also explains the attitude of Islamic moral to work and working people. The solicitude 
and respect for working people promotes the ennoblement of morals and leads to the devel-
opment in the young generation of that spirit of industry and humanism which is so necessary 
for any country wishing to achieve the high ideals of equality, justice and prosperity. The 
Mufti interprets Islam as a religion of working people, not of exploiters.  
The mufti describes the teachings of Islam on youth in accordance with socialist ideals. He 
thinks that Islam pays exceptionally great attention to the education of youth. The Holy Koran 
and the Sunna lay dawn that high moral qualities, respect for their elders, desire to work for 
the good of society should be cultivated in the younger generation. This is also spirit in which 
socialist society educates youth. The efforts of Islamic organisations and of the socialist state 
in this field, far form being opposed to one another, are to a great extent mutually comple-
mentary. Youth in the republics of the Soviet East have genuine Islamic traits of character. 
 
4. Islam and Fatherland 
 
For the Soviet leaders it was so important to get the support and love of all citizens includ-
ing Muslims on the Soviet motherland. Babakhan comments Islam as an essential source to 
produce love on the fatherland. He thinks that one of the most important demands which Is-
lam represents to Muslims runs as follows: “Be a devoted son of your native country, serve 
humanity”. The Mufti believes that among the main moral rules of a Muslim are fulfilling the 
duty to his / her country. In that sense every Muslims in the USSR strives to fulfil this sacred 
duty prescribed to him by Islam. Following the example of the Prophet Muhammad who   11
combined prayer and meditation with active service of his country and humanity as a whole, 
the Muslims of the Soviet Union combine the service of Allah and the observance of Islamic 
religious rites with due and conscientious fulfilment of social obligations deriving from the 
sacred duty of the Muslim to the people of his country and the whole of humanity.
45
Babakhan repeats that one of the main duties of a person to his country is to work its good. 
The richer society is the more possibility it has for improving the life of the citizens. Hence 
the better and more efficiently the Muslims work in social production, the more they promote 
the growth of their country’s might. It is known that ever since its establishment the Soviet 
socialist state has endeavoured to develop and stimulate the social and political activity of all 
its citizens, including the Muslims. Any objective observer has no difficulty in perceiving that 
the Muslims in the Soviet Union take on active part in all spheres of life, seeing this as a 
guarantee of strengthening their country’s might, by perfecting management methods in the 
various spheres of life, and developing the capabilities deposited in each human being by the 
Great Creator.
 46  
According to the Mufti, at the same time the Soviet Muslims see its defence against enemy 
attacks as another duty to their Fatherland. By looking thorough history, especially the Second 
World War, it is seen the heroism displayed by the Muslims in fighting the Nazi Germany. 
For self-sacrifice and courage in the struggle against the Nazis tens of thousands of Muslims 
were awarded orders and medals. That was exemplary fulfilment of their duty to their native 
country and humanity in the best traditions of Islam. Today too, the Muslims of the USSR, 
having mastered technology and the subtleties of military art, stand with their brothers of 
other nationalities and religious beliefs firmly on guard over the frontiers of the Fatherland, 
over world peace.
47
 
5. The Islamic Dogma, Cult and Socio-Ethical Problems 
 
As far as the main five pillars of Islam the shahada (profession of the unity of god), the 
salat (prayer), the zakat (compulsory alms), the savm (fasting) and the hajj (pilgrimage) are 
concerned the Soviet Muslims faced some serious difficulties.  
The Mufti explains the fundamentals of Islam and cult and the requirements of the Islamic 
morality mainly on the traditional Hanafite trend. To him, the dogma of Islam rests on the six 
basic convictions: belief in Allah, His angels, His books, His apostles, predestination, the end 
of this world, resurrection of the dead / the last judgement. He refers to five pillars of Islam. 
Of course the prayer is performed in rural even urban areas sometimes secretly, with the 
help of ulama who tended to minimize this obligation so as to avoid the attacks of the authori-
ties. On the Friday prayer he makes some points. To him in principle all adult male Muslims 
should be present, but women also have the right to attend the ceremony, though not, of 
course, with the men, but in closed galleries or a special section of the mosque or in the very 
last row of the congregation.
48  
It is known that the socialist Soviet rule claimed that there is no poor to beg and no rich to 
make charity in its regime, everymen is equal and under the welfare state protection. In this 
ideological circumstance it is difficult to talk about the zakat. However, the Mufti explains the 
compulsory alms in the traditional line. He believes that Muslims considers such alms as be-
ing very beneficial for the salvation of the soul, and often practise it, either distributing it di-
rectly to the poor or contributing money, land or other property to mosques, madrasas or 
charitable institutions.
49  
The hajj, practically forbidden until the Second World War, after that time only some se-
lected pilgrimages allowed going to Mecca. Fasting, because of official obstacles was simpli-
fied.   12
The Mufti mentions the rite circumcision / khitan which the atheists claimed that it is in-
human, unhealthy and barbaric feudal tradition as an Islamic symbol and one of the principal 
rites.
50 He says “as regard the attitude of Soviet Muslims to this ritual it may be said without 
exaggeration that they all consider it obligatory for themselves and their children and perform 
it in due time on boys in exact accordance with the Islamic doctrine”.
51  
The mufti never touches the matter of the relations between Sunnites and Shiites. Although 
in the rest of the Muslim world some intensive relatively hostile relations has been seen in the 
Soviet Union it has at least practically disappeared. Even the Azeri Sahiite students were edu-
cated in Bukhara Mir Arab Medrese and Tashkent Imam Bukhari Islamic Institute mainly in 
Sunni doctrine. 
 
6. The Spread of Islam in the Soviet Lands and Its Contribution to the Civilisation 
 
Some atheists insisted and claimed that Islam spread in Central Asia, Caucasus, the Volga 
region and the other places by force, i.e. by sword, being subjugated by Muslim armies. This 
approaches supported by the State and by some learned men.
52 But the Soviet Muslims in-
sisted that their ancestors accepted Islam willingly without any force. In this discussion the 
Mufti was on the second side. 
Babakhan emphasizes that Islam spread over the Earth, in particular on the Soviet Muslim 
lands with unprecedented speed. The first places in Soviet lands in which Islam began to 
spread were Azerbaijan and Daghestan by the effort of the second caliph Umar, then pene-
trated into Mavarau’n-Nahr in the second half of seventh century. Among the fighters of for 
Islam in the first place there ware the cousin of the Prophet, Qusam b. Abbas, the Prophet’s 
disciples Bureyda b. Husaib and Qays b. Assim who buried in Samarqand and Marw. In the 
time of Abdulmalik, Qutaiba b. Muslim reached China. At the beginning of the tenth century, 
the Bulgars of the Volga region embraced Islam.
53 To him, the main reason to spread of Islam 
among the peoples so rapidly is the enormous attractiveness of it. The Mufti believes that Is-
lam was not contrary to the interests of the peoples. He mentions the testimony of many writ-
ers of the middle ages, confirmed by modern scholars such as H. G. Wells and W. Barthold, 
showed that many peoples of the Caucasus and Dagestan, and Turks peoples embraced Islam 
in the main of their free will.
54  
The Mufti considers that Islam transformed the lives of the peoples who embraced it and 
enabled to contribute substantially to development of world civilisation. At the same time the 
Islamic civilisation was born not only by the Arabs, but all the Muslim peoples. The peoples 
of Central Asia contributed appreciably to the creation of the single Muslim culture which had 
an immense influence on world civilisation. Mavarau’n-Nahr was a land which produced bril-
liant scholars in all fields of science and literature, tafsir, hadith, kalam, fıqh, medicine, as-
tronomy, geology, mathematics, physics, geography, history and linguistic.
55 He was also 
pride of the Muslim architectures in the USSR as a great legacy.
56
 
7. The Reasons for the Decline of the Islamic Civilisation and Its Remedy 
 
One of the important questions to answer for all the Muslims of the last three century is the 
decline of the Islamic civilisation. Babakhan makes some comments on the issue. He believes 
that the basic reason was the attitude of the Muslim political leaders and of the ulama. He 
thinks that in recent centuries the Muslim leaders ceased to adhere strictly to the teachings of 
the Holy Koran and the Sunnah. In the course of the centuries works of the great Muslim sci-
entists did not receive due following and that science remained purely as a tradition, existing 
and for itself alone. The principles of Islam, transformed into a special instrument in the hands 
of the khans and emirs, were used in false interests. In their errors the rulers surrounded them-  13
selves with dishonest men, and condemned the best scientists to banishment. Everywhere fic-
tions began to be spread about magic, ideological disagreements were multiplied. The Islamic 
science itself was reduced to the lowest level of teachings material for linguistics, logic and 
rhetoric. At the same time most of them confined themselves to spreading racist and dogmatic 
theories among Muslims.
57  
According to the Mufti, as far as the ulama are concerned a real caste system began to 
spread among them, even religious appointments almost became hereditary. And it was so 
easy to see a man who called himself an imam hire somebody for money in one community or 
another to do his work for him, fulfilling the duties of the imam at prayers. Among the ulama 
there arose the false ideas that it was inadmissible to translate the verses / ayahs of the Koran 
into other languages. They declared that “the scientists of the past had prepared everything, 
and we have nothing to strive for”. Their false ideas led them to the absurd affirmation that 
there was no need for people to delve into the meaning and content of the Koran and the 
Hadith, that what was required was blindly faith in them, their mechanical reading and learn-
ing by rote. Babakhan considers that it is a false path declaring all religious and secular prob-
lems had already been solved by the preceding ulama, advocating preservation the humiliating 
social orders, and wishing to direct man’s thoughts and inner activity. Being grasping and 
multiplying their wealth, the ulama not only failed to care for the poor and beggars, as the 
Holy Koran demands, but were afraid that independent reasoning of believers on the holy 
texts, searching in them for the answer to problems set by life would lead to the downfall of 
their own tyrannical rule. As far as Central Asia concerned khans, beys, emirs and sultans of 
the region neglected the instructions given by eminent ulema of the past on the necessity for 
people to be guided by the Holy Koran and the Sunna to seek for themselves the right ways of 
solving the complex problems of earthly existence taking into account to concrete social situa-
tions.
58  
As far as its remedy is concerned, Babakhan believes that with the 1917 Russian socialist 
revolution all religions acquired equal rights before the state and society, and there opened out 
before the Muslims a great way of rebirth Islam, of active study of the Holy Koran and the 
Hadith, Soviet Muslims obtained the possibility to cultivate educational establishments in the 
spirit of love and devotion to the principles of the Holy Koran and the Hadith.
59  
The mufti underlines that life is dynamic and Muslim to be dynamic too. He believes that 
the time changes human being (ez-zaman gayyere’l-insan). He says that there are so many 
differences between the Muslims live five hundred years ago, or at least century and the Mus-
lims of our time. The Muslims have been changed a lot, and for the better by time, which have 
enriched and broadened their knowledge. They absorbed the experience and knowledge of 
previous generations of the Muslims, learned from the useful experience of other peoples. 
Technological and scientific progress has left its mark also on life, works and interests of 
Muslims.
60  
The Mufti believes that the Muslim of today has rightly rejected the idea of seclusion and 
isolation which pseudo-theologians preached, and resolutely followed the instructions of the 
Holy Koran concerning the necessity for intercourse with people of different nationalities and 
religious beliefs. The Koran does not condemn promoting a further broadening of contacts 
and cooperation with all people of good will for the sake of ensuring peace and well-being of 
nations. Babakhan rejects the idea cultivated by the enemies that Muslim is incapable of con-
tributing to modern science and technology, modern production and culture. The experience 
of Muslims in the Soviet Union and a number of other countries has convincingly demon-
strated that Muslims can and must be in the forefront of scientific and technological, social 
and economic progress.
61  
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8. Islam and Science 
 
There had been so many allegations in the atheistic literature that Islam is the enemy of 
science, totally contrary to it, a fanciful, fallacious and anti-scientific creed.
62 To response 
these claims the Mufti tries to show the friendship and cooperation between Islam and sci-
ence.  
According to the Mufti, on the subject there are numerous ayahs and hadiths. Islam and 
science were never opposed each other, nor can they be. First, Islam and science, faith and 
reason have one and the same source, one and the same Creator-Allah. Second, the objects 
studied by religion and by science also have one and the same source. Islam studies truths 
given by Allah people to be assimilated; science for its part studies nature made by the Crea-
tor reveals the laws of the world deposited in it by Allah. And the ever new achievements of 
scientific knowledge convince us the infinite wisdom of the Creator and of His Omnipotence. 
Muslim history knows no inquisition of the middle ages, no mass persecutions of science and 
scientists. On the contrary, precisely at the Middle Ages, the age of the wide spread and tri-
umph of Islam, falls the period of unprecedented flowering of science and culture in the Mus-
lim World.
63  
Babakhan reminds that the Central Asian Muslims raised some of the greatest scientists, 
eminent poets, famous theologians and jurists of the Islamic civilization. But as time went on, 
the majority of the Muslims led a life of poverty and had no rights whatever; the overwhelm-
ing majority of the population in these regions was illiterate. The ignorant khans and bays, 
who had usurped power, did not bother about implementation of the Islamic principles on the 
necessity for all Muslims- women and men- to acquire knowledge.
64
The Mufti also mentions the discussion on the palace of science in Islam at the end of the 
nineteenth century Russia. He refers the study of Ataullah Bayazıdov, akhund and imam of St. 
Petersburg’ grand mosque, Bayazıdov wrote a pamphlet called Islam i Nauk (İslam ve İlim) 
on relations between religion / Islam and science, in which he refuted the allegations that Is-
lam is the enemy to science which was mainly said by French thinker E. Renan.
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9. The Family 
 
The atheists with prejudice claimed that it is an undeniable fact that Islam takes a particular 
harsh line against women and advocates their segregation and oppression. The Soviets were 
vigorous fighter for modernising the traditional Muslim family structure. First of all, they be-
lieved that the Muslim family in traditional line is the real bastion of Islam and even Muslim 
identity; and attacked the polygamy, the veil, the payment of kalım (buying the wife), the po-
sition of women in Muslim society and family.
66   
The Mufti makes some points on this crucial issue. He considers that the family is the pri-
mary cell of any society. The way people are brought up in the family determines to a great 
extent their moral qualities and character. Here the relations of children with their parents are 
of great importance. If a person is reared in a family in which the children honour their par-
ents, respects their age, experience and knowledge, of other things being equal. That person 
can become honest, respectful and decent. On the other hand, it is difficult to expect noble 
conduct towards others in a person brought up in a medium in which the children have no 
respect for their parents. Islam supports and sanctions the natural love of children for their 
parents as a most important moral principle.
67  
He conceives that the Muslims’ attitude to women has changed. The old idea of woman as 
a mere object of amorous delight (metaatun cinsiyyetun) and a house slave (abdetu’l-beyt) 
whom a man buys, has been replaced by a conception of woman, based on undistorted under-  15
standing of the Holy Koran and the Sunah, as a member of society having equal rights with 
man, his companion and helper in his often difficult affairs.
68  
Islam is no less resolute in its utterances on a respectful attitude of members of the family 
to one another, on consideration for women. At a time when people in society were far from 
recognising the equality of women, the Holy Koran emphasises that man and woman were 
entirely equal before Allah.
69
 
Conclusion 
 
At the apex of the Soviet regime Sharaf Rashidov, first secretary of Uzbekistan Communist 
Party, touched the influence and role of the ulama in his report at the 1963 VIII
th Plenum of 
the Central Committee: “The clerics are cleverly adapting to the new conditions; they don 
various masks, they are fighting for each soul … they are especially interested in the young … 
It would be great mistake to imagine that they are fighting a losing battle. Their power and 
their influence are proved by the number of people at prayers in mosques, and by the number 
who observe religious festivals and religious rites.”
70 They were endeavouring to reconcile 
Islam with science and progress and to guarantee its survival in a modern environment, un-
doubtedly they served by an extremely energetic effort to preserve Islam at least in purity and 
integrity as religion and national sentiment and to prevent it from relapsing into deprivation 
and ignorance. 
In the case of the head of the most important Muslim religious board the Mufti of Tashkent 
Ziyaudddin Babakhan he interprets Islam as follows in the moderate line:  
1. Affirmation of Islam as a bulwark of progress, disseminator of knowledge, promoter of 
education, preceptor of equality, bearer of freedom, the religion of peace and friendship; de-
fence of Islamic rituals as scientific value; idealization of pristine Islam;  
2. Portraying of the Prophet Muhammad as a “democrat, reformer and revolutionary, even 
a socialist”;  
3. Reconciliation Islam with socialism and communism; always praising economic, social 
and cultural policies the Soviet regime, never mentioning its atheistic dimension;   
4. Modernization of the Sharia rules especially with regard to women, the family, and daily 
life. 
Because of lack of freedom and knowledge the official interpretation of Islam in the Soviet 
Union emerged in contradictions; i.e. from time to time conservative and liberal, so in a way 
could be considered moderate modernism. Some Soviet authors claimed that distorting its 
original nature from the very beginning of the Bolshevik regime the ulama interpreted Islam 
according to social, political, economic and cultural developments. But the ulama denied such 
allegation. However, though forced to adopt, Islam had not in any way been contaminated by 
Marxism, submissive to the atheist state, there had never been found any evidence to accuse 
the official ulama, even by their enemies, of infidelity (kufr), heresy (shirq), or innovation 
(bid’a). On the contrary, for example, as far as Islamic law and theology concerned, Islam in 
the USSR was the same religion it was before 1917.  
 Parallel to the activities of the official ulama, the revival processes of Islam and traditions 
slowly took place during the 1950s and 1960s especially in the Fergana Valley. The latent 
processes of religion in the region began to develop openly in the wake of the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union. At this stage politicization of Islam had also been seen. The political ex-
tremism and terrorism have become a reality in Central Asian too. There is growing realiza-
tion that there is a need for scholarly religious studies and for a different approach to the train-
ing of theologians. There is also a need to respond appropriately to the changes in the reli-
gious–political situation in the countries of Central Asian.   16
Despite its limited role, the Islam is a social and political reality in Central Asia which 
cannot be denied today. Its importance varies from country to country. Islam is constantly 
influencing the socio-political processes, shaping the concepts of values and regulating rela-
tions between people. Islam is also undoubtedly a political tool, whose role will grow to 
probably intensify the struggle between the various parties and groups, primarily between the 
regimes and oppositions. On the other hand, there are influential forces in Central Asia which 
insist on abridging the role of religion and taking it out of the political spheres. It seems that 
the best solution to this dichotomy is to reach a compromise between things purely secular 
and Islamic, in the absence of which the worsening of social, interethnic and religious con-
flicts will constantly threaten Central Asian societies. To solve the dichotomy another impor-
tant factors was the attitude of the ulama. In the Soviet period they earned very considerable 
and significant experiences which help to solve the problem.  
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